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Your friend is hiding in your house from a murderer. The murderer arrives and asks you whether your
friend is hiding in your house. Assuming you cannot stay silent, should you lie or tell the truth? (Kant
1797)
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a classic divide between the consequentialist view that optimal policy should be cal-
culated from considerations of costs and benefits and an alternative view, held by many non-
economists, that policy should be determined deontologically—people, society, and judges have
duties; from duties, they derive what is the correct law, right, and just. This paper asks the behav-
ioral question: Are there deontological motivations? If so, how would these motivations be formally
modeled? What do deontological motivations imply for economics? What puzzles can be explained
that elude standard models?
In the last few decades, economic theory has gradually expanded the domain of preferences.
The homo-oeconomics view that individuals are only motivated by selfish material consequences
confronted mounting evidence, usually in the lab, that individuals had other motivations–such as
fairness (e.g. Rabin 1993), inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999), reputation (e.g., Mc-
Cabe et al. 2003; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Dana et al. 2006, 2007), or social image (e.g., Bénabou
and Tirole 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009), to name a few. A common feature of these models is
that motivations are consequentialist, in the sense that preferences are over acts because of their ef-
fects. These preferences are prominently characterized as hypothetical imperatives—preferences over
acts because of their consequences—as opposed to categorical imperatives—preferences over acts
regardless of their consequences—which Immanuel Kant (1797) called deontological motivations.
In general, the presence of deontological motivations is hard to detect. The usual method to
measure deontological motivations is through survey or vignettes that present ethical dilemmas, like
the moral trolley problem (Foot 1967). What our paper develops is a revealed preference method
and a theorem that predicts invariance in the thought experiment if people are motivated solely
under consequentialist motivations—but, if deontological motivations are present, in combination
with consequentialist ones—then this thought experiment will reveal variance.
We can put an abstract form to the categorical imperative. Think of a decision-maker (DM)
making a decision d. We want to separate the motivation for the decision from the motivation for
its consequences. Consequences can be broad, including reputation, inequality, warm glow, and own
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payoffs. Consequences x is a function of the state of nature and decision d. There are two states, in
the consequential state, d becomes common knowledge and is implemented. In the non-consequential
state, d remains unknown to anyone, including the experimenter. With consequentialism, preferences
are over lotteries (Anscombe and Aumann 1963). With deontological motivations, d matters per se,
even in the non-consequential state. To illustrate, Kant said in his axe-murderer hypothetical, “You
must not lie,” no matter what are the consequences.
Think of d1, d2, .., d|D|, as possible decisions. Our experiment varies the probability that the deci-
sion is implemented. With some probability, pi, your decision is implemented—has consequences—and
with 1−pi, your decision has no consequence. So xC is a function of the decision and xN , some con-
stant outcome that’s invariant to your decision. This thought experiment can apply to any decision
with a moral element, but we illustrate our theorem using the dictator game as it is one of the games
most used in the academic literature.1 In a dictator game, you have your endowment ω, and you
can donate anywhere from 0 to ω. In our thought experiment, with some probability pi, decisions
are carried out. The recipient receives d and you receive the ω − d. With probability 1 − pi, your
decision is not implemented—recipient receives κ and you keep the remainder. Subjects put their
irrevocable decisions anonymously in sealed envelopes, and their envelope is shredded with some
probability with a public randomization device and the probability is known in advance (Figure 1).
Shredding means that the decision has no consequences, not even through the experimenter.2 The
decision only has consequences if the envelope is opened. Our shredding criterion for deontological
motivations parallels Kant’s discussion of his own thought experiment. Kant, likewise, allowed for
uncertainty—the possibility that the decision has the ultimate adverse consequence or has no con-
sequences3—but “to be truthful in all declarations is a sacred and unconditionally commanding law
of reason that admits no expediency whatsoever.” Kant’s categorical imperative focused on the act
itself rather than the expected consequences of an act. It is this motivation we seek to model and
1A google scholar search for “dictator game” yields 14 thousand articles, “trust game” 13 thousand, and “public
goods game” 12 thousand. A search for “ultimatum game” yields roughly 22 thousand results and this is studied in
more detail in Chen and Schonger (2015). We also considered “lying game” and “lying aversion”, which only appear
roughly 600 times each. “Prisoner’s dilemma” appears roughly 49 thousand times, but we chose to focus on the
simplest decision without strategic considerations. Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) likewise use the dictator game in
their study of social image motivations. An analog can also be made between donations and tithing or tax morale.
2This eliminates motivations related to experimenter observation (Cilliers et al. 2015) and any altruism related to
the societal good of providing one’s data for science.
3“It is indeed possible that after you have honestly answered Yes to the murderer’s question as to whether the
intended victim is in the house, the latter went out unobserved and thus eluded the murderer, so that the deed would
not have come about.”
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Figure 1.— Lab Implementation
uncover behaviorally.
The closest field analogs of our experiment may be found in two recent papers. First, Bergstrom
et al. (2009) examined the decision to sign-up as a bone marrow donor. With some probability the
decision to sign-up has consequences, such that the recipient receives bone marrow and the donor
undergoes expensive and painful surgery. Bergstrom et al. (2009) found that those less likely to sign
up to be a bone marrow donor came from ethnic groups that, due to genetic match and need, were
more likely to be called off the list to donate. They argue this pattern to be a puzzle. Second, Choi
et al. (2012) studied the decision not to abort a fetus with Down Syndrome. Prospective parents
varied in the probability the decision to abort had consequences. They found that as the prospect
became more real (hypothetical, high-risk, vs. diagnosed), parents were more likely to abort. In
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both Bergstrom et al. (2009) and Choi et al. (2012), as pi decreased, people became more likely to
choose a decision that might be interpreted as deontological. However, in both settings, d is not
irrevocable and not anonymous and pi is not exogenous, leaving room for potential confounders.
In our laboratory setting, d is irrevocable and anonymous and pi is exogenously assigned to the
individual.
Formally, we show that pure deontologists following the categorical imperative would not change
their behavior as the probability changes, but, counter-intuitively, it turns out that pure consequen-
tialists also do not change their behavior. We provide a graphical and formal proof that someone
who satisfies the behavioral assumption of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) and is purely
consequentialist will not change their behavior as the probability changes. Simply put, the decision-
maker is choosing between lotteries G and F , so if G first-order stochastically dominates F with
respect to % (i.e., if for all x′:
∑
x:x′%xG(x) ≤
∑
x:x′%x F (x)), then if a decision d is optimal for
one probability pi, it is the optimal d for all probabilities. As a corollary, we can state the result
with expected utility (a stronger behavioral assumption than first order stochastic dominance).4
For the decision-maker donating the marginal penny, the marginal benefit of donating is the recip-
ient’s well-being and any social consequence of that increase. The marginal cost is to give up that
penny. The decision-maker equates the marginal benefits and marginal costs. As the probability
that the decision is implemented falls, then both the marginal benefits and costs fall equally, so the
decision-maker still makes the same decision on the margin because the indirect objective function
is proportional to the utility of the decision implemented with certainty.
To bridge our theorem to experimental evidence, our first study uses subjects in a lab. We
asked subjects to choose an amount for a charitable recipient (as illustrated in Figure 2), a third-
party aid organization. We found that subjects became 50% more charitable when the decision was
hypothetical. Our second piece of evidence uses an online anonymous experiment, allowing large
samples and very low implementation probabilities; but a difference is that d is observed by the
experimenter even in the non-consequential state. If motives related to the experimenter or the
study are strong, we may expect less variance. We found that subjects became 33% more charitable
as the decision became hypothetical.
4The corollary holds since expected utility’s independence axiom implies the axioms of first order stochastic dom-
inance.
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Figure 2.— Actual Experiment
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DM 
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Decision d has no consequence. 
2 never learns d. 
Payoff DM: 𝑥1𝑁 = 𝜔 − 𝜅 
Payoff R: 𝑥2𝑁 = 𝜅 
 
State C 
Decision d has consequences. 
 
Payoff DM: 𝑥1𝐶 = 𝜔 − 𝑑 
Payoff R: 𝑥2𝐶 = 𝑑 
 
    π    1- π 
It is possible that subjects become more charitable as the implementation probability falls be-
cause they value some kind of ex-ante fairness involving preferences over expected outcomes (Traut-
mann 2009; Krawczyk 2011; Chlaß et al. 2014).5 While this is not a deontological motivation in
Kant’s typology, it is a behavioral motivation that can confound the interpretation of our results. To
investigate that motive, the two experiments also had a treatment arm where the non-consequential
state involves the entire sum being donated. Our data can rule out an expected-income targeter,
who should have become less generous in response to reductions in pi. Our data can also rule out
other ex-ante fairness motivations. Finally, our data on decision time suggests that cognition costs
are also not the explanation for variance between high and low pi.
Our third piece of evidence illustrates how assumptions on the curvature of motives together
with data on decision variance can inform how individuals trade-off between consequentialist and
deontological motives. We use standard parameterizations of a structural model—consequentialist
motivations are estimated with a classic Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion utility while deontological
motivations are estimated as a bliss point as in Cappelen et al. (2007) and Cappelen et al. (2013).
The variation in our data generated by the experiment is consistent with largely deontological rather
than consequentialist motives under the entire range of standard inequity aversion parameters.
5See also work on distributive justice (Elizabeth Hoffman 1985; Konow 2000) and procedural fairness (Gibson et al.
2013; Brock et al. 2013).
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Like Bergstrom et al. (2009) observing more bone marrow donations and Choi et al. (2012)
observing more decisions to not abort when the decisions were more hypothetical, we see d increases
when pi falls. What our model suggests is that as the probability falls, the (net negative) consequences
of carrying out the act falls, but the (deontological) benefits of the act remain high. Moreover, the
direction of change can give insight into the location of the maximand for an individual’s duty
(relative to the consequentialist maximand). Assuming the pure deontologist’s maximand is higher
than the pure consequentialist’s maximand, reducing the probability results in decisions that are
more deontological.
Our paper makes two contributions to the economic literature—theoretical and experimental.
Economic models have thus far focused on hypothetical imperatives (preferences over acts because of
their consequences). This interpretation is supported by Sobel’s (2005) extensive literature review
of interdependent preferences, part of which offered a typology of non-homo-oeconomics models. In
one class are Chicago School models that model preferences over general commodities transformed
into consumption goods. In another class are identity models (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000) with
utility functions over actions and an identity that incorporates the prescriptions that indicate the
identity-appropriate behavior. Sobel noted that “the models of Akerlof–Kranton and Stigler–Becker
are .. mathematically identical. It is curious that these formally equivalent approaches are associated
with schools of thought that often are viewed as opposites. The theories are identical because they
are consistent with precisely the same set of observations.” In our reading, both classes of models
fall under the hypothetical imperative: Chicago agents choose between quantities, but do not have
preferences over choices vs. preferences over quantities. In identity models, agents choose acts,
but do not have preferences over acts vs. preferences over consequences of acts. The categorical
imperative would distinguish these preferences. Our thought experiment and shredding criterion
likewise distinguishes choices from quantities and acts from consequences of acts.
Empirical researchers also have assumed that choices do not enter the utility function separate
from the causal effects of choices. For example, in the random lottery incentive, experimental subjects
make many choices, but only one of them is chosen at random to be implemented. In this oft-
used method in experimental economics, if decisions involve a deontological element, the degree
of pro-social behavior may be over-estimated, the lower the likelihood of implementation. In the
strategy method—another method often used to increase statistical power—subjects make many
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choices corresponding to possible states that may depend on what other subjects choose, but only
a fraction of decisions count for pay. Deontological motives would imply that this bias from random
lottery incentives would never disappear, no matter how high the stakes are.
Likewise, in surveys (which includes contingent valuation), subjects report preferences in non-
consequentialist settings (e.g., valuation of an environmental good in a hypothetical scenario), and
the decisions may change as the decision becomes more likely to be implemented.6 In measuring
willingness to pay, subjects report a price that is implemented if it is higher than a randomly
generated price in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method. In the Vickrey auction, bidders submit
written bids that are consequential if it is the highest bid. The higher the price, the more likely
the decision has consequences. In market design data, subjects report preferences over choices over
schools whose likelihood of being consequential varies.
Notably, our operationalization of deontological motives—choosing a decision regardless of the
likelihood of implementation (i.e., irrespective of the consequences)—bears close similarity to the
concept of legitimacy defined in psychology. Tyler (1997) characterized perceived legitimacy of laws
and organizations as that which motivates obedience to rules irrespective of likelihood of reward or
punishment. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related literature.
Section 3 defines consequentialism, deontologicalism, and mixed motivations. It proves that behavior
is invariant to the probability for pure consequentialism or deontologicalism, but varies with mixed
motives. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Adam Smith’s (1761) impartial spectator in The Theory of Moral Sentiments may have been
deontological though perhaps also consequentialist.
“The patriot who lays down his life for. . . this society, appears to act with the most exact propriety. He
appears to view himself in the light in which the impartial spectator naturally and necessarily views him,
. . . bound at all times to sacrifice and devote himself to the safety, to the service, and even to the glory of
the greater . . . . But though this sacrifice appears to be perfectly just and proper, we know how difficult
it is. . . and how few people are capable of making it.” (emphasis added) (Smith 1761).
6Papers on the strategy method (Chen and Schonger 2015) and survey design (Cavaille et al. 2018) offer fuller,
formal treatments of the issues, literature reviews, meta-analysis, and new experiments that complement the current
study.
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There is a vast economics literature on concepts related to deontological motivations. We refer the
reader to Sobel’s (2005) extensive literature review and focus our discussion here to subsequent
work.7
The three closest theoretical developments may be as follows. First, deontological motivations
may relate to identity investment. In Bénabou and Tirole (2011), moral decision-making is mod-
eled as a form of identity investment that prevents future deviant behavior. Here, motives can be
deontological or consequentialist. The DM cares about the fact that the decision is implemented.
Second, deontological motivations may also relate to expressive motives. People may participate
in elections even when their vote is not pivotal because of a perceived duty to vote (Riker and
Ordeshook 1968). Feddersen et al. (2009) and Shayo and Harel (2012) formalize that insight where
individuals obtain a small positive payoff by the act of voting for an option independent of the
electoral outcome, which they test with experiments by varying the probability of being pivotal.
Here, expressive motives can be deontological or consequentialist. The DM cares about the fact that
the vote is cast. Election outcomes are public, so a message is sent to the public and vote share
can affect the legitimacy of a candidate. DellaVigna et al. (2013) show experimentally that act of
voting includes motives to tell others. Third, deontological motivations may also relate to “homo
kantiensis”, whose preferences are ones that are socially optimal when everyone else also holds that
view (Alger and Weibull 2013). Alger and Weibull (2013) report that such preferences are selected
for when preferences rather than strategies are the unit of selection and they find that preferences
that are a convex combination of homo oeconomicus and homo kantiensis will be evolutionarily
stable. Here, motives can be deontological or consequentialist. The DM cares about the outcome of
everyone making the same decision.8
7Some exceptions not covered in the literature review include earlier work by Binmore (1994), arguing that John
Rawls justifies the “original position” behind the veil of ignorance as an operationaliziation of Kant’s categorical
imperative, and by Harsanyi (1977), saying that empathetic preferences—requiring us to put ourselves in the position
of another to see things from their point of view—is, under mild conditions, important for an implementation of
Rawls’ theory of justice.
8Warm glow motives can also be deontological or consequentialist. In an earlier theoretical contribution, Andreoni
(1990) points out that DMs in a public goods contribution framework can derive utility not only from the total
amount of the public good G provided, but also from her contribution g. However, the author suggests in Andreoni
and Bernheim (2009) that social audience motivations can provide micro-foundation for the warm glow. Thus, the
DM cares about the fact that the decision is observed. In other work, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) has a
utility function incorporating own payoff, others’ payoff, and how others think of me. The DM cares about the
consequences of actions. Deontological motivations may also relate to guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg
2007). The prototypical cause would be the infliction of harm or distress on the recipient, which can be deontological
or consequentialist.
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A large experimental literature has been interested in studying the motives for pro-social behav-
ior. The shredding criterion can be distinguished from the experimental paradigm that varies the
probability that one’s decision will have an impact, since in those paradigms the decision-maker
experiences the cost of helping in both states of the world (Batson et al. 1991; Smith et al. 1989).9
In other experimental paradigms (Feddersen et al. 2009; Shayo and Harel 2012; Grossman 2015;
Gneezy 2005), the decision-maker experiences the benefits of the decision in both states of the
world. In a contemporaneous research design that is related, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) use a
modified dictator game with random implementation probabilities, but there are five differences.
First, we make the recipient a charitable organization outside the lab; in their study, the recipients
are in the room observing the decision and dictators become more generous as the probability of
implementation increases because they are motivated by their social audience. Second, we make
both the probability and the realization of the state of nature public; in their study, recipients
observe the probability but not the fact that nature chose the outcome. Third, in their study, they
acknowledge there may be motivations regarding what the experimenter infers and regard this as a
confound; our lab experiment shreds decisions, which directly removes that confound. Fourth, their
study uses the strategy method and subjects play several games, whereas in our study, each subject
sees only one probability and we do not use the strategy method. Fifth, they recognize the impor-
tance of not using within-subject variation for any particular game; we directly remove sequence
effects and contrast effects (for example, if an experimenter asks two questions with a higher and
lower probability, subjects may feel the right answer is to give more in one scenario, which would
be a confound for our invariance theorem).10
Large literatures outside of economics, such as psychology, political science, sociology, and law
have discussed concepts related to deontological motives. Sacred values and taboos are also often
interpreted as pertaining to duty, and that some actions cannot be evaluated through costs and
benefits (Tetlock 2003). Some of these have been analyzed by economists—conflicts of sacred values
(Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012), repugnance (Roth 2007; Mankiw and Weinzierl 2010), and saving
9These studies examine whether one’s help actually helps, rather than whether one’s help will be carried out : the
cost of the decision is experienced by subjects whether or not their decision to help is effective. These studies find,
like Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), that as the probability falls, generosity declines, while we find the opposite.
10In another contemporaneous study, Grossman (2015) also uses a modified dictator game with random implemen-
tation probabilities, but each participant played the role of dictator and served as recipient for someone else. The
study does not shred the decisions, so the decision’s contribution is still a consequence. More broadly, we rule out
motives related to the beliefs of others since the third-party aid organization is unaware of the subject.
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the lives of mice (Falk and Szech 2013). Besley (2005) has argued to screen for deontological moti-
vations in business leaders, politicians, or judges. In contrast, Kaplow and Shavell (2006) criticize
relying on non-consequentialist motivations in optimal policy design as it would necessarily harm
some individuals.
3. THEORY
In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sinnott-Armstrong (2012) define consequential-
ism as, “the view that normative properties depend only on consequences” and explains that
“[c]onsequentialists hold that choices—acts and/or intentions—are to be morally assessed solely
by the states of affairs they bring about.” Utilitarianism is one example of a consequentialist moral
philosophy (Bentham 1791); in fact any welfarist view is consequentialist (Arrow 2012). By contrast,
deontological ethics holds that “some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter
how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden.” (Alexander and Moore
2012).11
We introduce our thought experiment and focus on this definition of consequentialism and the
invariance theorem first. We illustrate the intuition for the theorem under expected utility (this
intuition is a corollary of the main theorem), a graphical proof of the invariance theorem, and
then the formal statement of the assumptions along with the theorem itself. Next, we formalize
deontological motivations as a lexicographic preference–duty first, then consequences–and show
invariance still holds. We then show variance when individuals have both consequentialism and
deontological motivations and the direction of change under additive separability.
3.1. Thought Experiment
The idea to identify non-consequentialist motivations by varying the probability of the DM’s
decision being consequential guides this paper. The DM has a real-valued choice variable d which
influences both her own monetary payoff x1 as well as the payoff x2 of a recipient R. There are two
states of the world, state C and state N . In state C, the DM’s decision d fully determines both x1
and x2. In state N , both x1 and x2 take exogenously given values, and the decision d has no impact
at all. Thus, in state C, the decision is consequential, while in state N , it is not. After DM chooses
11Virtues ethics, which originates in the work of Plato and Aristotle, would also be a non-consequentialist motivation
we seek to uncover. To economize on terminology, we will only refer to deontological ethics. We also make no distinction
between positive and negative duties.
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Figure 3.— Thought Experiment: General Idea
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Payoff R: 𝑥2𝐶  function of  𝑑 
 
    π    1- π 
1: DM decision-maker 
2,3..: There may be 
passive others. 
 
d, nature randomly decides which state is realized. State C occurs with probability pi > 0, state N
with probability 1−pi. The structure of the game is public, but the decision d is only known to DM.
In state N , therefore, R has no way of knowing d, but, in state C, R knows d, indeed he can infer
it from x2. Superscripts indicate the realized state, so that the payoffs are (xC1 , xC2 ) in state C, and
(xN1 , x
N
2 ) in state N . Figure 3 illustrates this.
This general experimental design could be used for many morally relevant decisions; here we
apply our identification method to the dictator game and thus to the moral decision to share. As
shown in Figure 2, the DM receives an endowment of ω, and must decide how much to give to R.
She may choose any d such that 0 6 d 6 ω and the resulting payoffs are xC1 = ω − d and xC2 = d.
For pi = 1, the game thus reduces to the standard dictator game. In state N , a pre-determined,
exogenous κ will be implemented, where 0 6 κ 6 ω, and xN1 = ω − κ and xN2 = κ are the resulting
payoffs.
3.2. Intuition
We illustrate the intuition of the invariance theorem under expected utility. Given expected utility,
the DM maximizes:
E[u(x, d)] = piu(xC1 , x
C
2 , d) + (1− pi)u(xN1 , xN2 , d)
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and her indirect objective function in case of the dictator game can be written as:
V (d) = piu(ω − d, d, d) + (1− pi)u(ω − κ, κ, d).
Limiting attention to pure consequentialists, the problem simplifies to:
E[u(x)] = piu(xC1 , x
C
2 ) + (1− pi)u(xN1 , xN2 )
and the indirect objective function to:
V (d) = piu(ω − d, d) + (1− pi)u(ω − κ, κ).
Note that now the d does not enter in the second term, which corresponds to state N . The indirect
objective function is proportional to u(ω − d, d), so ∂d∗∂pi = 0.
3.3. Graphical proof
In the previous subsection, we have seen that if the DM satisfies the axioms of expected utility
then if d∗ is not constant in the probability she cannot be a consequentialist. Put differently, if
we observe a DM to vary her decision in the probability we would reject the joint hypothesis
that the DM is a consequentialist and an expected-utility maximizer. Since expected utility theory
often fails to describe behavior (Starmer 2000) such a joint test would tell us little about whether
consequentialism or expected utility or both were rejected. It is therefore desirable to have much
weaker assumptions about decision-making under objective uncertainty than expected utility theory.
Here we show that first-order stochastic dominance is sufficient for the result.
First, we provide a graphical sketch of the invariance proof. That is, someone who satisfies the
behavioral assumption of preference relations of FOSD and is purely consequentialist will not change
their behavior as the probability changes. The left-hand side of Figure 4 provides an example of
FOSD. Think of an ordering over outcomes, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the Y-axis and the corresponding
lotteries F and G. G looks better than F since instead of getting 3, sometimes the DM gets 4.
Formally, G first-order stochastically dominates F with respect to % if for all x′:
∑
x:x′%xG(x) ≤∑
x:x′%x F (x).
For every outcome x′, the probability of any outcome worse than x′ is lower under G than under
F . That can be represented graphically on the right, as a CDF. For the proof, recall that decisions
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Figure 4.— First Order Stochastic Dominance
are choices over lotteries like F and G. Suppose 1 is the non-consequentialist outcome, and let 3 or
4 be the active choice. What does changing the probability do? It moves the horizontal bar up and
down. But G always FOSD F . So if a choice is optimal for one probability, it is the optimal choice
for all probabilities.
3.4. Formal statement of assumptions and theorem
In our delineation, we try to adapt major concepts of moral philosophy to economics, and bring
the precision of economic methodology, in particular revealed preference, to moral philosophy. It
may seem odd to model deontological motivations by utility functions since one may view “utility”
as a consequence, but since ours is a revealed preference approach, we follow the usual economics
approach (Friedman and Savage 1948) of modeling decision-makers’ behavior as if they maximized
that objective function and refrain from interpreting the function as standing for utility or happiness.
We allow the utility u of the DM to be a function of her own monetary payoff x1, as well as the
monetary payoff of the recipient x2 to capture consequentialist other-regarding motives, and d to
capture deontological motives. In the general case with all motivations present, the Bernoulli utility
function satisfies u = u(x1, x2, d). The standard theories of decision-making by Savage (1972) and
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) rely on the assumption that the domain of consequences is state
independent.
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Definition 1 Consequentialist Preferences: A preference is consequentialist if there exists
a utility representation u such that u = u(x).
We call a preference consequentialist-deontological if it incorporates concerns beyond the conse-
quences, and considers actions or decisions that are good or bad per se:
Definition 2 Consequentialist-deontological Preferences: A preference is consequentialist-
deontological if there exists a utility representation u such that u = u(x, d).
Now let us turn to purely deontological preferences. At first, one might think they are simply
mirroring the other extreme of consequentialist preferences and could thus be represented by u =
u(d). But, since duty is like an internal moral constraint, even fully satisfying one’s duty may leave
the DM with many morally permissible options rather than one unique choice. A deontologist can
be formalized as having a lexicographic preference on decisions d and outcome x, with deontological
before consequentialist motivations.
Definition 3 Deontological Preferences: A preference is called deontological if there exist
u, f such that u = u(d), and f = f(x), and for all (x, d), (x′, d′): (x, d) % (x′, d′) if and only if
u(d) > u(d′) or [u(d) = u(d′) and f(x) = f(x′)].
It is possible to model purely deontological people as having a different choice set (Nozick 1974).
But traditionally a choice set is the objective, external constraints facing a person and we call the
internal constraints preferences. Thus, we model deontological moral constraints on the decision-
maker as internal constraints, that is, as the first part of preferences in a lexicographic framework.
The reason we do not model duty like a budget constraint but as part of preferences, and thus
lexicographic is twofold: First, unlike budget constraints, internal moral constraints are not directly
observable; second, for consequentialist-deontological preferences that feature a tradeoff rather than
a lexicographic ordering of these motivations, one could not model duty as an inviolable constraint.
This can be formalized as a lexicographic preference, with deontological before consequentialist mo-
tivations. Note that while economists may think of our method as detecting where a DM feels most
duty among competing duties (i.e., the optimand of one’s greatest duty rather than the optimand of
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one’s duty), some philosophers believe there is no possibility of a genuine conflict of duties in deon-
tological ethical theory, which can distinguish between a duty-all-other-things-being-equal (prima
facie duty) and a duty-all-things-considered (categorical duty) (Alexander and Moore 2012).
We delineate assumptions that allows us to experimentally identify with observable choice be-
havior whether subjects have preferences where both motivations are present (i.e., whether their
preferences belong to the category of consequentialist-deontological preferences). The standard con-
sequentialist approach to (and a central assumption for) choice under uncertainty is first-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD). A wide variety of models of choice under uncertainty satisfies FOSD
and thus falls within this framework, among them most prominently, expected utility theory, its
generalization by Machina (1982), but also cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992) or rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1982).
Following the canonical framework as laid out in Kreps (1988), let there be outcomes x. x can
be a real valued vector. In the thought experiment, it would be x = (x1, x2). Let the set of all x
be finite and denote it by X. A probability measure on X is a function p : X → [0, 1] such that∑
x∈X p(x) = 1. Let P be the set of all probability measures on X, and therefore, in the thought
experiment, a subset of it, is the choice set of the decision-maker.
Axiom 1 (preference relation) Let % be a complete and transitive preference on P .
Axiom 1 is the standard one saying that the preference relation is a complete ordering. It im-
plicitly includes consequentialism since the preference relation is on P , that is, over lotteries that
are over consequences x.
Next we define first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Often, definitions of FOSD are suitable
only for preference relations that are monotonic in the real numbers, for example see Levhari et al.
(1975). These definitions define FOSD with respect to the ordering induced by the real numbers,
assuming that prices are vectors. It is important to define FOSD with respect to ordering over
outcomes rather than the outcomes themselves.12
Definition (FOSD) p first-order stochastically dominates q with respect to the ordering induced
by %, if for all x′:
∑
x:x′%x p(x) ≤
∑
x:x′%x q(x).
12FOSD over outcomes is inappropriate in the context of social preferences, which are often not monotonic due to
envy or fairness concerns.
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Axiom (FOSD) If p FOSD q with respect to the ordering induced by %, then p % q.
Definition (Strict FOSD) p strictly first-order stochastically dominates q with respect to the
ordering induced by % if p FOSD q with respect to that ordering, and there exists an x′ such that:∑
x:x′%x p(x) <
∑
x:x′%x q(x).
Formally, our theorem needs both strict FOSD and weak FOSD since strict FOSD does not imply
weak FOSD.
Axiom (Strict FOSD) If p strictly FOSD q with respect to the ordering induced by %, then p  q.
The following theorem implies that in our thought experiment, changing the probability of being
consequential pi does not change the decision.
Theorem 1 If the DM satisfies the axioms Preference Relation, FOSD, and Strict FOSD, and
there exist x, x′, x′′ ∈ X ′ and pi(0; 1] such that pix + (1 − pi)x′′ < pix′ + (1 − pi)x′′, then for all
pi′(0; 1] : pi′x+ (1− pi′)x′′ < pi′x′ + (1− pi′)x′′.
It is this prediction of the theory that we will test and interpret a rejection of the prediction as
evidence that people are not purely consequentialist. Proofs and additional theoretical discussion
are relegated to Appendix A.
Fact 1 (Deontological preferences) For purely deontological preferences the optimal decision
d∗ is constant in the probability pi.
This is because in these lexicographic preferences, a person is either pure deontological or pure
consequentialist in comparing possible decisions. Formally, there is no trade-off. A lexicographic
deontologist maximizes u(d) first, then there is a compact set where she maximizes v(x) next. Our
theorem applies to either the pure consequentialist portion v(x) or the deontological portion u(d).
3.5. Consequentialist-deontological preferences
Next, we illustrate consequentialist-deontological preferences where the optimal decision changes
as the probability of being consequentialist changes. For exposition, we do so in the context of Figure
2 and simplify notation such that the net consequences are a function of x1.
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Example 1 u = u(x1, d) = x1 + b(d), where b1 > 0 and b11 < 0.
Then V (d) = pi(ω − d) + (1− pi)(ω − κ) + b(d) is strictly concave in d. The first-order condition
is b1(d) = pi and thus for an interior solution ∂d
∗
∂pi =
1
b11(d)
< 0. The second order condition is
b11(d) < 0. Note that if the consequentialist and deontological choice is the same, then the choice
is still invariant to the implementation probability: f1(ω − d) = b1(d) = 0, then ∂d∗∂pi = 0.
For a slightly more general example: let u(x1, d) = f(x1) + b(d). Then, U(x1, d) = pi(f(xC1 ) +
b(d)) + (1 − pi)(f(xN1 ) + b(d)) and V (d) = pif(ω − d) + (1 − pi)f(ω − κ) + b(d). The first order
condition is: ∂V (d)∂d = −pif1(ω− d) + b1(d) = 0. For d∗ to be a maximum, the second order condition
yields: ∂
2V (d)
∂d2
= pif11(ω − d) + b11(d) < 0. Applying the implicit function theorem to the first order
condition yields: ∂d
∗
∂pi =
f1(ω−d∗)
pif11(ω−d∗)+b11(d∗) < 0, since utility is increasing in its own outcomes and the
denominator which is the second derivative of the indirect objective function is negative. Note that
the recipient’s payoff is a function of the DM’s payoffs, but as long as other-regarding concerns are
concave then the sum of utility from its own payoffs and utility from others’ payoffs is still concave
and the above result holds. Decisions do not have to be continuous to obtain this result. If decisions
are discrete, then the behavior of a mixed consequentialist-deontological person is jumpy (i.e., it
weakly increases as her decision becomes less consequential).
For more complicated utility functions, non-additive or non-globally convex ones, it is possible
to generate examples where ∂d
∗
∂pi =
1
b11(d)
> 0. Suppose the DM has preferences represented by
u = u(x1, d). Assume that the first derivatives are positive (monotonicity), and that u11 < 0 and
u22 < 0 (risk-aversion). Then the DM maximizes V (d) = piu(ω−d, d) + (1−pi)u(ω−κ, d). The first
order condition is −piu1(ω−d, d) +piu2(ω−d, d) + (1−pi)u2(ω−κ, d) = 0. By the implicit function
theorem, and simplifying using the first order condition gives:
∂d∗
∂pi
=
1
pi2
[−2u12(ω− d, d) +u11(ω− d, d) +u22(ω− d, d) + 1− pi
pi
u22(ω−κ, d)]−1u2(ω−κ, d)
So for sufficiently negative u12(ω − d, d) we can get ∂d∗∂pi > 0. Utility functions that are not globally
convex can lead to local maxima that, when the decision is less consequential, can lead to jumps to
maxima involving lower d.13
13In related work, Chen et al. (2015) explores modeling and testing the shape of the cost of taking actions that
one disagrees with morally or politically.
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3.6. Potential Confounds
3.6.1. Ex Ante Fairness
A potential confound to testing the invariance theorem in an experiment is that people could
have preferences over the lotteries themselves if they view them as procedures, rather than if their
preferences are fundamentally driven by the prizes (consequences or the decision). In our experimen-
tal setup, for example a subject might target the expected income of the recipient, and thus vary
the decision in the probability. This section shows formally that by varying κ we can test whether
people have these ex-ante considerations. Targeting the recipient’s expected income can be assessed
by our research design by seeing if the sign of ∂d
∗
∂pi flips in the two treatment arms, one where κ is
set at 0 and another where κ is set at the maximum.
Example 2 Targeting the recipient’s expected income. Consider the following preferences U (x1, x2) =
E[x1] + a (E[x2]) =pixC1 + (1− pi)xN1 + a
(
pixC2 + (1− pi)xN2
)
. Let a be a function that captures al-
truism and let it be strictly increasing and strictly concave. Note that this objective function is not
linear in the probabilities. The indirect objective function is V (d) = pi (ω − d) + (1 − pi) (ω − κ) +
a (pid+ (1− pi)κ). The first-order condition is a1 (pid+ (1− pi)κ) = 1 . By the implicit function
theorem, ∂d
∗
∂pi =
κ−d∗
pi . Thus the optimal decision changes in the probability. In two special cases, it
is easy to determine the sign of the derivative, even if d∗ itself is not (yet) known: if κ = 0, then
∂d∗
∂pi 5 0 , and if κ = ω, then
∂d∗
∂pi = 0.
Let us look at a more general case: U = f (E[u (x1)], E[u˜ (x2)]), where f is f1, f2 > 0 (strictly
increasing), f12f1f2 − f11f22 − f22f21 > 0 (strictly quasi-concave), (f12f2 − f22f1 > 0 and f12f1 −
f11f2 ≥ 0) or (f12f2− f22f1 ≥ 0 and f12f1− f11f2 > 0) (strictly normal in in one argument, weakly
normal in the other), u, u˜ is u1, u˜1 > 0 (strictly increasing), u11, u˜11 ≤ 0 (weakly concave) and
pi > 0. Then, the indirect objective function is
V (d) = f (piu (ω − d) + (1− pi)u (ω − κ) , piu˜ (d) + (1− pi) u˜ (κ))
Note that V (d) is globally strongly concave:
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1
pi
∂2V (d)
(∂d)2
= − (2f12f1f2 − f11f22 − f22f21 ) 1f22 piu21 (ω − d)
+f1u11 (ω − d) + f2u˜11 (d) < 0
So, there exists a unique solution. The First-order condition for this problem is u˜1(d)u1(ω−d) −
f1
f2
=
0 ≡ F . The FOC defines d∗ implicitly as a function of pi. By the implicit function theorem ∂d∗∂pi =
−
∂F (d∗,pi)
∂pi
∂F (d∗,pi)
∂d∗
. As ∂F (d
∗,pi)
∂d∗ has sign of
∂2V (d)
(∂d)2
< 0: sgn
(
∂d∗
∂pi
)
= sgn
(
∂F (d∗,pi)
∂pi
)
. It can be shown that:
∂F (d∗, pi)
∂pi
=
u˜1 (d
∗)
f1
(f12f1 − f11f2) [u (ω − d∗)− u (ω − κ)]
+
u1 (ω − d∗)
f2
(f12f2 − f22f1) [u˜ (κ)− u˜ (d∗)]
So the sign of ∂d
∗
∂pi (pi) depends on the difference between d
∗(pi) and κ:
For d∗(pi) = κ: ∂F (d
∗,pi)
∂pi = 0 thus
∂d∗
∂pi (pi) = 0
For d∗(pi) < κ: ∂F (d
∗,pi)
∂pi > 0 thus
∂d∗
∂pi (pi) > 0
For d∗(pi) > κ: ∂F (d
∗,pi)
∂pi < 0 thus
∂d∗
∂pi (pi) < 0
Now if κ = 0, then ∂d
∗
∂pi 6 0, while for κ = ω,
∂d∗
∂pi > 0.
Thus experimentally, by varying κ we can test whether people have these ex-ante considerations.
In sum, targeting the recipient’s expected income can be assessed by our research design by seeing
if the sign of ∂d
∗
∂pi flips in the two treatment arms. Motivations pertaining to forms of residual
uncertainty that take into account ex-ante considerations but mix them with ex-post considerations
would also predict the sign to flip.
3.6.2. Cognition Costs
Another explanation for variance in the probability might be cognition costs. Cognition costs
are a consequence, but unlike the other consequences, they are not captured in our consequentialist
framework since they are incurred during the decision and are a consequence that even arises if the
non-consequential state is realized. Formal modeling and experimental test of cognition costs seems
to be rare in the literature. For a previous example, albeit one that does not have the decision-maker
solve the metaproblem optimally, see Wilcox (1993). This section shows that a cognition-costs model
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would predict that 1) time spent on the survey also changes with pi as d changes. Our research design
also provides a second test: 2) Subjects with greater cognition costs should have δdδpi = 0 for a larger
range of pi near 0.
To fix ideas, consider the following model: u = u(x1, x2, γ), where u1, u2 > 0, uγ < 0 and γ ≥ 0.
In addition, let us assume that utility is continuous. The DM can compute the optimal decision, but
to do so, she incurs a cognition cost γ > 0, otherwise she can make a heuristic (fixed) choice d¯ for
which (normalized) costs are 0. We have no model of what the heuristic choice is, and in principle
it could be anything. Suppose the heuristic choice tends to be a cooperative or fair one (Rand et al.
2012) so, for example, the reader might think of d¯ = ω2 . In any case, expected utility from the
heuristic choice is V (d¯) = piu(ω − d¯, d¯, 0) + (1 − pi)u(ω − κ, κ, 0). By contrast, for a non-heuristic
choice, V (d) = piu(ω − d, d, γ) + (1 − pi)u(ω − κ, κ, γ). Define dˇ ≡ argmaxV (d). Obviously, dˇ does
not vary in pi. The DM will choose to act heuristically if V (dˇ) < V (d¯) or
F (pi) ≡ V (dˇ)− V (d¯) = pi (u(ω − dˇ, dˇ, γ)− u(ω − d¯, d¯, 0))
+ (1− pi) (u(ω − κ, κ, γ)− u(ω − κ, κ, 0)) < 0
Since (1− pi) (u(ω − κ, κ, γ)− u(ω − κ, κ, 0)) < 0, we can distinguish two cases:
i) If u(ω − dˇ, dˇ, γ)− u(ω − d¯, d¯, 0) < 0, F (pi) is always negative, so the person uses the heuristic
choice, independent of pi.
ii) In the other case, u(ω − dˇ, dˇ, γ) − u(ω − d¯, d¯, 0) > 0, there exists a unique pi with 0 < pi < 1
such that F (pi) = 0, the person switches from heuristic to non heuristic. This derives from the fact
that in this case F (pi) is strictly monotone in pi, F (0) < 0 and F (1) > 0, so for probabilities of
being consequential close to 1 computing is better, and for probabilities close to zero, the heuristic
is better. Since dˇ 6= d¯, this means that such cognition costs predict that even a consequentialist DM
will not be invariant to the probability. For the rest of this section, we will focus on this case.
Now suppose we vary the cognition cost, that is, we do an exercise in comparative statics and
investigate how pi varies in γ, and note that
∂pi
∂γ
=
−piu3(ω − dˇ, dˇ, γ)− (1− pi)u3(ω − κ, κ, γ)
u(ω − dˇ, dˇ, γ)− u(ω − d¯, d¯, 0) + u(ω − κ, κ, 0)− u(ω − κ, κ, γ) > 0,
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Figure 5.— S-Shape Cognition Costs
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that is, the higher the cognition costs, the higher the threshold for probability being consequential
such that computation is the better choice. Obviously, there are some very low γ and some very
high γ such that locally, pi is a constant function of γ, but there, the above assumptions are violated.
Figure 5 shows when, as a function of a probability, someone would incur a given cognition cost. So
if we could experimentally vary not only probability but also cognition costs and then observe it,
the cognition cost story predicts the pattern shown in the figure.
In summary, variation in the decision d with respect to pi is consistent with decision-makers
switching to a heuristic d¯, which may be higher or lower than the preferred choice dˇ, leading to the
inability to infer consequentialist-deontological preferences. If decision-makers have different γ or
different d¯, then we might observe a smooth δdδpi . A cognition-costs model, however, would predict
that 1) time spent on the survey also changes with pi as d changes. We also provide a second test: 2)
Subjects with greater cognition costs should have δdδpi = 0 for a larger range of pi near 0. An S-shape
curve in cognition costs incurred and thus in decisions with respect to pi, is more shifted, the higher
cognition costs are. Figure 5 plots the cognition costs incurred against pi. The dotted line is for the
subject experiencing low cognition costs while the dashed line is for the subject experiencing high
cognition costs.
3.6.3. Self Image
A conceptual distinction can be made between self-image and duty. Firstly, rather than self-
image motives, “the central insight that gives deontology its name is that in moral reflection, the
self discovers that an act ought to be done; it owes it to itself to do justice to this obligation” (Junker-
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Kenny 2013). Secondly, self-image motives affect decisions simply when subjects anticipate finding
out about peers (Bigenho and Martinez 2019). Individuals may also punish others who threaten their
ego (Chen and Prescott 2016). Thirdly, self-signaling often modeled as an investment with long-term
consequences (Bénabou and Tirole 2011).14 To be sure, even purely deontological preferences likely
have some neurobiological consequence, which perhaps could be studied with fMRIs.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Lab Experiment
We ran the lab experiment in Zurich using zTree (Fischbacher 2007). We asked subjects aged
18-30 to make a donation decision out of an endowment of 20Chf with the knowledge that we would
shred their decision when it was not implemented. One session collected data from a classroom,
but the procedures were the same and the endowment was 10Chf. All our results are reported in
terms of percent donation. The donation recipient was Doctors Without Borders as we believed this
organization to be more salient in German-speaking countries.
Participants first saw a demonstration of a public randomization device (Appendix B includes
pictures and instructional materials) and a paper shredder; the shredding bin was opened to publicly
verify that materials were truly going to be destroyed. Prior to the experiment, subjects were asked
three IQ tasks. If at least one answer was correct, they proceeded to the donation decision and
received information about their probability of implementation. We had a 2x2 design: Subjects were
randomly assigned to low (pi = 316) or high probability (pi =
15
16) of implementation, and to minimum
(κ = 0) or maximum (κ = ω) donation in the non-consequential state. The randomization wheel
had sixteen numbers. We only mentioned one or three of these numbers to the subject depending on
their pi. The numbers between 1 and 16 were randomly chosen to minimize the potential influence of
anchoring on the results. They were then asked to write a decision to be placed in a sealed envelope.
After the wheel was spun, envelopes that were to be destroyed were collected and shredded. The
remainder were opened and participants were paid. Among 264 subjects, 71 envelopes were opened.
We over-sampled subjects who received low probabilities. If we assign the same number of subjects
to each treatment condition, far fewer data will be collected for pi = 316 treatment condition where
14This suggests that memory would be a mediating mechanism for self-image concerns. Thought experiments
proposed by philosophers motivate an experimental design for future research where a decision-maker forgets (and
knows that forgetting will occur), e.g., consider an individual taking an action knowing that he resides in Plato’s
cave.
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only few envelopes are opened. We sought a roughly 1:1 ratio for the opened envelopes in the high
and low pi conditions. All results only analyze the decisions of envelopes opened as we do not have
data for envelopes that were shredded.
Participants donated an average amount of 25% when pi was high and 38% when pi was low.
Figure 6 disaggregates the results by κ and the vertical lines indicate means for each treatment
group. Ex-ante fairness concerns would predict the effect of pi to flip depending on the location of κ,
but we observed an increase in donations (of roughly 50%) for both κ = 0 and κ = Max treatments.
Figure 6.— Donation and pi: Disaggregated by κ
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Table I reports regression results indicating that the change in donations is significant at the
10% level without κ fixed effects (Columns 1) or with κ fixed effects (Column 2). The estimates
are stable. The R-square is 0.045 only including pi. The magnitude of the effect is equivalent to
roughly half the mean donation. Extrapolating linearly suggests that increasing the likelihood of
implementation from 0% to 100% reduces the donation by roughly 17 percentage points. Columns 3-
6 test for ex ante consequentialism. Increasing the likelihood of implementation from 0 to 1 strongly
reduces the expected income by the donee (Columns 3-4) and strongly increases the expected giving
of the donor (Columns 5-6), whether or not κ fixed effects are included. These effects are significant
at the 1% level. The following presents additional visualizations of these results.
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TABLE I
Donation and pi: Linear Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean dep. var.
% Consequential (π) -0.176* -0.159* -0.259** -0.278*** 0.212*** 0.219***
(0.0978) (0.0855) (0.108) (0.0802) (0.0484) (0.0452)
Κ Fixed Effects N Y N Y N Y
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
R-squared 0.045 0.292 0.077 0.506 0.218 0.339
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Raw data shown in Figures 4 and 5.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
0.120.390.30
Table 1: Shredding Experiment (Κ Pooled)
Ordinary Least Squares
d* Expected Income E(x2) Expected Giving (πd*)
Figure 7 graphically examines the ex ante fairness explanation. It shows that as pi changes,
expected income of the recipient is not fixed; it increases when κ is high and decreases when κ is
low. When we calculate the expected income of a beneficiary, we use the data for subjects whose
envelopes were opened and combine it probabilistically with κ.
Figure 7.— Expected Income E(x2) and pi: Disaggregated by κ
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Figure 8 shows that as pi changes, expected giving by the decision-maker is also not fixed.
Expected giving does not depend on κ. It only depends on d and pi. Our results indicate that for
both κ, expected giving drops by two-thirds as pi goes from high to low. The statistical significance
(1% level) of the mean impact is displayed in Columns 5 and 6 of Table I.
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Figure 8.— Expected Giving (pid∗) and pi: Disaggregated by κ
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Table II presents Mood’s median tests of the null hypothesis that medians of the two populations
are identical. It has low power relative to the Mann Whitney test, but is preferred when the variance
is not equal in different groups. We can see the variances are different in Figure 6. The median tests
report significant differences at the 5% level for pi and for κ.
TABLE II
Donation and pi: Non-Parametric Tests
Thresholds Pooled
π = 3/16 vs. π = 15/16 0.04
K = 0 vs. K = Max 0.01
Non-parametric test for equality of medians, 2-sided test (p-values)
4.2. Online Experiment
We ran the online experiment using MTurk. We first asked MTurk subjects to transcribe three
paragraphs of text to reduce the likelihood of their dropping from the study after seeing treatment.
After the lock-in task, subjects have an opportunity to split a 50 cent bonus (separate from the
payment they received for data entry) with the charitable recipient, the Red Cross. We believed the
Red Cross to be more well-known for MTurk subjects, who come mostly from the U.S. and India.
Workers then provided their gender, age, country of residence, religion, and how often they attend
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religious services. We had 902 decisions from 902 subjects.15
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five groups with pi being: 100%, 66%, 33%, 5%,
and 1%. They were told in advance about the implementation probability. We randomized such
that we collected roughly 200 subjects in each of the 66%, 33%, 5%, and 1% treatments and 100
subjects in the 100% treatment. In addition, we randomize κ to be 50 cents (maximum) and 0 cents
(minimum). Appendix C presents instructions.16 All our analyses are reported in terms of fraction
donated from 0 to 1.
Figure 9 shows that the lower the pi, the more generous is the decision-maker. The increase
in generosity is monotonic with the decrease in probability. Donations increased from 18% (when
pi = 1) to 27% (when pi = 0.01). The following presents regression results and we can again strongly
reject the hypothesis that subjects are targeting expected income or expected giving.
152 individuals did not report a complete set of demographic characteristics, so they are dropped in some of the
regressions.
16To assess potential anchoring effects induced by κ, we also ran an auxiliary experiment that randomized κ to
be 10 cents or unknown to workers (they are told the computer is making a determination) and we draw κ from a
uniform distribution between 0 and 50. When κ was unknown, we also asked workers what they believed would be
the amount donated if the computer made the decision. We found that 18% of subjects gave 10 cents in the “κ = 10
Cents” treatment while 14% gave 10 cents in the “κ = Unknown” treatment. Since we did not see significant anchoring
effects, it is not the focus of our analysis.
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Figure 9.— Donation and pi: Raw data (MTurk)Figure 3 (AMT Experiment) 
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Table III reports that the effect of pi is significant at the 5% level in a linear regression in
Column 1. The effect size of 7.2% is roughly one-third of the mean donation of 23%. Column 2
adds demographic controls.17 The point estimates are stable. Columns 3 and 4 consider if subjects
target expected income and Columns 5 and 6 consider expected giving. We can strongly reject the
hypothesis that subjects are targeting these quantities. Increasing the likelihood of implementation
from 0 to 1 reduces the expected income of the donee by 22% and increases the expected giving of
the donor by 20%.18
TABLE III
Donation and pi: Linear Regression (MTurk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean dep. var.
% Consequential (π) -0.0725** -0.0684* -0.224*** -0.219*** 0.194*** 0.213***
(0.0288) (0.0390) (0.0334) (0.0299) (0.0132) (0.0181)
Κ Fixed Effects N Y N Y N Y
Controls N Y N Y N Y
Observations 902 900 902 900 902 900
R-squared 0.007 0.059 0.048 0.604 0.194 0.214
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Raw data shown in Figure 10.  Controls include indicator variables for 
gender, American, Indian, Christian, Atheist, aged 25 or younger, and aged 26-35 as well as continuous measures for 
religious attendance and accuracy in the lock-in data entry task.   * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2: AMT Experiment (Κ Pooled)
Ordinary Least Squares
d* Expected Income E(x2) Expected Giving (πd*)
0.23 0.34 0.07
Table IV presents separate linear regressions for each κ treatment-arm. In each pair of columns
(without controls and with controls), we find a quantitatively similar 5.3% to 7.8% decrease as pi
goes from 0 to 1. The effects are not significantly different across treatment arms.
17Country of origin was coded as United States and India with the omitted category as other; religion was coded as
Christian, Hindu, and Atheist with the omitted category as other; religious services attendance was coded as never,
once a year, once a month, once a week, or multiple times a week.
18To make calculations on expected donations when κ is unknown, we use data on perceived donation.
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TABLE IV
Donation and pi: Linear Regression Disaggregated By κ (MTurk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean dep. var.
% Consequential (π) -0.0778 -0.0654 -0.0525 -0.0321 -0.0711 -0.0708 -0.0644 -0.0675
(0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0526) (0.0536) (0.0464) (0.0466) (0.0462) (0.0456)
Male -0.0909** -0.0474 0.0108 0.0178
(0.0399) (0.0430) (0.0395) (0.0362)
American 0.0241 -0.0539 0.0838 0.117*
(0.0524) (0.0539) (0.0664) (0.0598)
Indian -0.0672 -0.0785 -0.0673 -0.0626
(0.0566) (0.0560) (0.0630) (0.0590)
Christian -0.0295 0.0584 -0.0215 -0.000293
(0.0483) (0.0503) (0.0494) (0.0479)
Atheist -0.0188 0.00480 0.0113 -0.0927
(0.0644) (0.0649) (0.0802) (0.0725)
Religious Services Attendance -0.00614 0.000508 0.00367 -0.00546
(0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Ages 25 or Under -0.0207 -0.122** -0.0109 -0.113**
(0.0518) (0.0570) (0.0493) (0.0474)
Ages 26-35 0.00271 -0.110* -0.00105 -0.111**
(0.0548) (0.0593) (0.0493) (0.0480)
Own Errors -0.000192 -0.000186 0.000220 -0.000148
(0.000193) (0.000163) (0.000194) (0.000143)
Observations 260 260 218 218 256 255 271 270
R-squared 0.009 0.069 0.005 0.081 0.009 0.052 0.007 0.097
Table 3: AMT Experiment (by Κ)
Ordinary Least Squares
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Κ = 50¢Κ = 0¢Κ = 10¢Κ = Unknown
Decision (d) Decision (d) Decision (d) Decision (d)
0.26 0.22 0.20 0.22
We next examine whether the distributions of donation decisions are significantly affected by pi.
Table V shows that along most thresholds for pi, Mann-Whitney tests yield significant differences
in the distribution of donations as pi increases. To interpret, 0.05 in Column 1 means that we reject
with 95% confidence the hypothesis that the distribution of decisions for subjects treated with
pi = 1, 0.67, 0.33 is the same as the distribution of decisions for subjects treated with pi = 0.05, 0.01.
The lower panel of Table V reports that the distribution of donations does not significantly vary by
κ. Means are also not significantly different by κ.
DEONTOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS 31
TABLE V
Donation and pi: Non-Parametric Tests (MTurk)
(1) (2) (3)
Thresholds Κ Unknown or 10¢ Κ = 0¢ or 50¢ Κ Pooled
π = 1 vs. π ≤ 0.67 0.91 0.05 0.11
π ≥ 0.67 vs. π ≤ 0.33 0.07 1.00 0.20
π ≥ 0.33 vs. π ≤ 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.01
π ≥ 0.05 vs. π = 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.01
π Pooled
K ≥ 10¢ vs. K = 0¢ 0.40
K = 50¢ vs. K ≤ 10¢ 0.11
Thresholds Pooled
π = 3/16 vs. π = 15/16 0.16
K = 0 vs. K = Max 0.16
Table 4: AMT Expe iment
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 2-sided test (p-values)
Table 5: Shredding Dictator Game (Zurich data) 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 2-sided test (p-values)Next, we reject cognition costs as the driving feature for decision change. The three findings are
1) individuals spend roughly the same time thinking about their decision regardless of the imple-
mentation probability, 2) donations were not associated with time spent, and 3) those estimated to
be most responsive to implementation probability do not seem to be resorting to heuristics more,
at least measured by time spent.
Figure 10 shows that individuals spend roughly the same time thinking about their decision
regardless of the implementation probability, which is inconsistent with the cognitive cost model,
where individuals spend less time thinking and use altruistic heuristics when their decision is less
likely to be implemented. Moreover, subjects do not donate less when they spend more time on
their decision to compensate for cognition effort.
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Figure 10.— Time Spent (on Donation Decision): LabFigure 4 (Shredding Experiment) 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
De
ns
ity
0 50 100 150 200 250
Seconds Spent
π = 3/16 π = 15/16
Time Spent by Probability of Being Consequential
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 50 100 150 200 250
π = 15/16
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 50 100 150 200 250
π = 3/16
Fr
ac
tio
n 
Do
na
te
d
Seconds
Time Spent and Donation Decision (Κ Pooled)
On MTurk, we did not have data on the time spent before and after the donation decision
and only had data for the entire MTurk session, which is displayed in Figure 11. We find that
time spent is only affected (and reduced) by pi = 1. This result would appear inconsistent with a
cognition costs theory where individuals spend more time on decisions when they are consequential.
Donations were again not associated with time spent, but would be negatively associated under
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Figure 11.— Time Spent (Begin vs. End Time): MTurk
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a theory that cognition costs explain increased generosity when the implementation probability is
low.
Table VI shows that at low pi, those with below-median δdδpi spend less time than those with
above-median δdδpi (see below for an explanation for how these groups are determined). In addition,
Figure 12 shows that those with high δdδpi do not vary their time spent as pi changes. These findings
are inconsistent with the cognition cost model in that those whose behaviors are most elastic to pi
(high δdδpi ) do not seem to be resorting to heuristics more when the probability of being consequential
is low, at least measured by time spent.
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TABLE VI
Time Spent (Begin vs. End Time): MTurk Heterogeneity by δd
δpi
Sample
(1) (2) (3)* (4) (5)*
Mean dep. var. 20.8
% Consequential (π) 0.0123 0.0176 0.0452 0.163*** 0.118*
(0.0162) (0.0547) (0.0574) (0.0548) (0.0635)
π2 -0.000482 -0.000452 -0.00167*** -0.00122*
(0.000573) (0.000602) (0.000581) (0.000674)
Above Median Mixed- 0.755
  Consequentialist (1.119)
π * Above Median -0.0386*
  Mixed-Consequentialist (0.0227)
Observations 900 449 449 451 451
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.019
Table 7: Time for Completion of Survey (AMT Experiment)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Mixed-Consequentialist aggregates for each subject their demographic 
characteristics' contribution to the effect of π on the Donation decision.  Regressions are weighted by the 
standard deviation of the first regression to account for uncertainty in the calculation of mixed-consequentialist 
score.  Columns 3 and 5 employ median regressions.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Above Median Mixed-
Consequentialist
Below Median Mixed-
ConsequentialistAll Subjects
Figure 12.— Time Spent by δdδpi : MTurk
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To estimate high and low δdδpi and to explore sensitivity of the decision d to pi, we construct
synthetic cohorts. Formally, we estimate:
Donationi = β0pii + β1Xipii + αXi + εi
We interpret the change in d to pi as measuring the mixed consequentialist-deontological motives.
We then compute for each individual:
MixedConsequentialistDeontologicali = |βˆ0 + β̂1Xi|
We use all the demographic characteristics inXi to construct the mixed consequentialist-deontological
score. Each subject’s demographic characteristics are then used to calculate a predicted mixed
consequentialist-deontological score by taking the absolute value of the sum of the contributions of
their demographic characteristics along with the constant term.
Table VII shows that along all demographic groups, δdδpi < 0. Americans, Christians, Atheists,
and those who are less likely to attend religious services are particularly likely to have steeper δdδpi .
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TABLE VII
Who responds to pi? (AMT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mean dep. var.
% Consequential (π) -0.100** -0.0493 -0.124** -0.0500 -0.0522 -0.0774 -0.0618 -0.0548 -0.0839** -0.0190
(0.0494) (0.0429) (0.0506) (0.0436) (0.0403) (0.0616) (0.0467) (0.0443) (0.0407) (0.126)
π * Male 0.0612 0.0490
(0.0577) (0.0611)
π * American -0.0675 0.0370
(0.0627) (0.0911)
π * Indian 0.0990* 0.0426
(0.0574) (0.0963)
π * Christian -0.0599 -0.0658
(0.0632) (0.0783)
π * Atheist -0.133 -0.145
(0.0837) (0.108)
π * Religious Services Attendance 0.00394 -0.00739
(0.0210) (0.0224)
π * Ages 25 or Under -0.0149 -0.0815
(0.0576) (0.0787)
π * Ages 26-35 -0.0386 -0.0878
(0.0597) (0.0808)
π * Own Errors 0.000402 0.000319
(0.000299) (0.000307)
Κ Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.060 0.062 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.068
Table 6: Who Is Mixed Consequentialist-Deontological? (AMT Experiment)
Ordinary Least Squares
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Decision (d)
0.23
4.3. Structural Estimation
This section presents structural estimates of how individuals trade off between consequentialist
and deontological motivations. We provide two illustrations. First, we follow Cappelen et al. (2007)
and Cappelen et al. (2013) and assume that homogenous individuals maximize homo oeconomi-
cus consequentialist motivations, but place weight λ on a deontological portion that follows bliss
point preferences: u(xDM,, x2, d) = λ(x1) + (− (δ − d)2) = λ(1− d) + (− (δ − d)2).19 The first-order
condition is 0 = piλ(−1) + 2(δ − d), which results in a linear regression, −λ2pi + δ = d∗.
Note that we can interpret the constant term of the linear regression as the bliss point, repre-
senting the decision when pi = 0. Figure 9 would yield a bliss point δ = 0.25, which is very close to
the observed 27% when pi = 0.01. Then, since we can pin down one of two unknown parameters, we
can identify the weight placed on deontological motivations using the speed of change as pi varies;
in this case, λ = 0.14. Note that a pure homo oeconomicus would maximize d∗ at 0, which is why
λ increases monotonically with speed of change.
19Note this means that a Cappellen et al. model views duty as d = δ rather than d ≥ δ. We assume that subjects’
duties are enumerated in percent terms.
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TABLE VIII
Donation and pi: Linear Regression
OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
Mean dep. var. 0.23
% Consequential (π) -0.239*** -0.363*** -0.368***
(0.0249) (0.0548) (0.139)
π * 1(d ≥ w/2) 0.870*** 1.516*** 1.542**
(0.0412) (0.250) (0.714)
Constant (Duty Bliss Point) 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.0116) (0.0131) (0.0134)
IV N π, Indian π, Age ≤ 25
Observations 902 902 902
R-squared 0.336 0.155 0.140
Table 8: Trading Off Co seque tialist-Deontological Motivat ns (AMT Experiment)
Decision (d)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Our second illustration models consequentialist motivations as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), plugging
in α and β inequality parameters for u(xDM,, x2, d) = λ(x1−αmax{x2−x1, 0}−βmax{x1−x2, 0})+
(− (δ − d)2). The individual’s first-order condition over their choice d is then given by the following
expression: If 12 > d, then 0 = piλ(2β − 1) + 2(δ − d), else 0 = piλ(−2α − 1) + 2(δ − d).20 Thus,
we run a linear regression of d on 1[12 > d]pi and 1[
1
2≤d]pi. We present estimates using two different
instruments for 1[12≤di], which results in similar point estimates (Table VIII).21
The bliss point is still 25%. Then, the first coefficient in the regression model indicates that
while d < 50%, donation increases as pi decreases. However, once d > 50%, donation decreases
as pi decreases. This switch is intuitive because the bliss point for duty is below 50% and we still
assume Cappelen et al. bliss point preferences. As pi falls, they should move towards the bliss point,
which is less than 50%. Our coefficients also have a structural interpretation for λ. Table VIII yields
λ(2β−1)
2 = −0.36 and λ(−2α−1)2 = 1.16. Finally, we need to make an assumption for α and β. For
20We model consequentialist motivations as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), plugging in α and β inequality parameters for
u(xDM,, x2, d) = λ(x1 − αmax{x2 − x1, 0} − βmax{x1 − x2, 0}) + (− (δ − d)2). The individual’s first-order condition
over their choice d is then given by the following expression: If 1
2
> d, then 0 = piλ(2β − 1) + 2(δ − d), else
0 = piλ(−2α− 1) + 2(δ − d).
The derivation is as follows: piλ(1 − d − αmax{2d − 1, 0} − βmax{1 − 2d, 0}) + (− (δ − d)2). This expression is
quadratic in d, so the first-order condition, and hence moment conditions, will be linear in d. Thus, we estimate a
linear regression to back out our parameters of interest. To see this, first observe that the decision-dependent portion
of expected utility if 1
2
> d, is: piλ(1− d− β(1− 2d)) + (− (δ − d)2), else piλ(1− d− α(2d− 1)) + (− (δ − d)2). Thus,
our linear regression is: If 1
2
> d, then pi λ(2β−1)
2
+ δ = d∗, else pi λ(−2α−1)
2
+ δ = d∗. This expression motivates our
GMM condition:
E
[
pi
(
1[ 1
2
> d]
[
d− pi λ(2β−1)
2
− δ
]
+ 1[ 1
2
≤ d]
[
d− pi λ(−2α−1)
2
− δ
])]
= 0.
21The OLS regression is also presented, but problematic because the decision appears on the left-side of the equation
as outcome and on the right-side in the indicator function. The data limits our choice of instruments for 1[ 1
2
≤di] that
is not directly correlated with di. The instruments are being under 25 or being from India.
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the range of plausible α and β values in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), our data is inconsistent with the
joint hypothesis of consequentialist motivations being Fehr-Schmidt, the duty motivation being bliss
point, and a non-zero weight on consequentialist motivations.22 Taken together, each of the three
exercises offer unique advantages and limitations that portray a picture of variance in response to
the probability of implementation.
5. CONCLUSION
Recent advances in economic theory, motivated by experimental findings, have led to the adop-
tion of models where individuals make decisions not solely based on self-interest (considering con-
sequences for oneself), but also based on the consequences for others. Investigations of motives over
decisions per se, independently of their consequences, are rare. In this paper, we formalize the no-
tion of consequentialist as well as deontological motivations as properties of preference relations; we
suggest and implement a thought experiment that uses revealed preference to detect deontological
motivations—varying the probability that one’s decision is consequential (i.e., implemented). For a
consequentialist who satisfies first order stochastic dominance, the optimal decision is independent
of the probability that the action will be enacted. For a deontologist, the optimal decision is also in-
dependent of the probability. Only mixtures of both consequentialist and deontological motivations
predict changes in behavior as the probability changes.
Our research design has some implications for the random lottery method in experimental eco-
nomics. Prior formal observations support its use—roughly speaking, if individuals satisfy the in-
dependence axiom (Holt 1986), then the random lottery method is valid—and these theoretical
observations have been empirically validated (Starmer and Sugden 1991; Hey and Lee 2005). What
we show is that when it comes to decisions that are not purely economic (e.g., social preference deci-
sions that can have a deontological motive), if individuals satisfy FOSD, the random lottery method
can reveal different decisions that are more pro-social than when the decisions are consequential.
Future research may explore several legal applications. First, measuring intent in law, most
famously, in criminal law when a distinction is made between mens rea (intention) and actus reus
(act): did the shooter intend to kill (but didn’t) or did the shooter unintentionally commit the act
22With two equations and three unknowns, we cannot identify our parameters. However, we can choose values for
β and α in the range of values in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). But, if individuals are inequality averse and are more
averse to adverse inequality, we know that α > β > 0; examining λ(−2α−1)
2
= 1.16 implies λ < 0, but λ = 0 is a
boundary condition.
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of killing. In other instances, the law also cares about mental states beyond just the consequences,
such as the litigant’s motivations in copyright disputes, where a litigant has cause of action only
if she is motivated by her moral rights to litigate, that is, she is not litigating because of the
consequences of winning. More broadly, in equity law, judges may care about opportunistic behavior
as opposed to the behavior itself, which is similar to the decision-maker having both mens rea
and actus reus. Finally, some philosophers argue that human dignity derives from the possibility
of deontological decision-making—“what commands respect is the capacity for morality” (Waldron
2012) and “Everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something
else as its equivalent; what, on the other hand, is raised above all price and therefore admits of no
equivalent has a dignity. .. humanity insofar as it is capable of morality is that which alone has
dignity” (Kant 1797).
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APPENDIX A: FORMAL STATEMENT OF ASSUMPTIONS AND THEOREM
This appendix provides additional details and proofs for our results. For completeness, we also include all relevant
information from the main text in this appendix.
The standard consequentialist approach to choice under uncertainty (and central assumption for choice behavior
regarding uncertainty) is first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). A wide variety of models of choice under uncer-
tainty satisfies FOSD and thus falls within this framework, among them most prominently, expected utility theory,
its generalization by Machina (1982), but also cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) or rank-
dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1982). Stochastic dominance is a compelling criterion for decision-making quality
and is generally accepted in decision theory (Quiggin 1990; Wakker 1993; Choi et al. 2014).
In the following paragraph and the axioms up to FOSD, we closely follow the canonical framework as laid out
in Kreps (1988). Let there be outcomes x. x can be a real valued vector. In the thought experiment, it would be
x = (x1, x2). Let the set of all x be finite and denote it by X. A probability measure on X is a function p : X → [0, 1]
such that
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1. Let P be the set of all probability measures on X, and therefore, in the thought experiment,
a subset of it, is the choice set of the decision-maker.
Axiom 2 (preference relation) Let % be a complete and transitive preference on P .
Axiom 1 is the standard one saying that the preference relation is a complete ordering. It implicitly includes
consequentialism since the preference relation is on P , that is, over lotteries that are over consequences x.
Next we define first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Often, definitions of FOSD are suitable only for preference
relations that are monotonic in the real numbers, for example see Levhari et al. (1975). These definitions define FOSD
with respect to the ordering induced by the real numbers, assuming that prices are vectors. It is important to define
FOSD with respect to ordering over outcomes rather than the outcomes themselves.23
Definition (FOSD) p first-order stochastically dominates q with respect to the ordering induced by %, if for all x′:
∑
x:x′%x p(x) ≤
∑
x:x′%x q(x).
Axiom (FOSD) If p FOSD q with respect to the ordering induced by %, then p % q.
Formally, our theorem needs both strict FOSD and weak FOSD since the former does not imply the latter.
Definition (Strict FOSD) p strictly first-order stochastically dominates q with respect to the ordering induced by
% if p FOSD q with respect to that ordering, and there exists an x′ such that:
∑
x:x′%x p(x) <
∑
x:x′%x q(x).
Axiom (Strict FOSD) If p strictly FOSD q with respect to the ordering induced by %, then p  q.
23FOSD over outcomes is inappropriate in the context of social preferences, which are often not monotonic due to
envy or fairness concerns.
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The following theorem implies that in our thought experiment, changing the probability of being consequential pi
does not change the decision. It is this prediction of the theory that we test and interpret a rejection of the prediction
as evidence that people are not purely consequentialist.
Theorem 2 If the DM satisfies the axioms Preference Relation, FOSD, and Strict FOSD, and there exist x, x′, x′′ ∈
X ′ and pi(0; 1] such that pix+(1−pi)x′′ < pix′+(1−pi)x′′, then for all pi′(0; 1] : pi′x+(1−pi′)x′′ < pi′x′+(1−pi′)x′′.
Proof: (i) x % x′: Suppose not, then x′  x, and therefore pix′ + (1 − pi)x′′ strongly first-order stochastically
dominates pix+ (1− pi)x′′. Then by axiom Strict FOSD, pix′ + (1− pi)x′′  pix+ (1− pi)x′′, a contradiction.
(ii) Since x % x′ , pi′x+ (1− pi′)x′′, first-order stochastically dominates pi′x′ + (1− pi′)x′′. Thus by axiom FOSD,
pi′x+ (1− pi′)x′′  pi′x′ + (1− pi′)x′′. Q.E.D.
The theorem has a corollary for the case of expected utility:
Corollary If the decision-maker satisfies axiom Preference Relation and maximizes expected utility and there exist
x, x′, x′′ ∈ X ′ and pi(0; 1] such that pix + (1 − pi)x′′ < pix′ + (1 − pi)x′′, then for all pi′(0; 1] : pi′x + (1 − pi′)x′′ <
pi′x′ + (1− pi′)x′′.
The corollary holds since expected utility’s independence axiom implies the axioms of FOSD and Strict FOSD.
Note that in the thought experiment and experimental setup, d affects the recipient only via the payoff xC2 . Thus, the
theorem applies even to situations where the DM cares about not only the recipient’s outcome but also about the
recipient’s opinion or feelings about the DM or her decision d. Thus, for consequentialist preferences, even allowing
such consequences as others’ opinions, the DM’s optimal split does not depend on the probability of the DM’s split
being implemented.
Formally, our theorem needs both strict FOSD and weak FOSD since the former does not imply the latter.24 Are
there assumptions besides strict FOSD so we don’t need both strict and weak FOSD? Yes, if a preference satisfies
Preference Relation, Strict FOSD, Continuity, and Rich Domain then it satisfies FOSD.25
Definition % is continuous if for all p, q, r ∈ P the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+(1−α)q % r} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : r % αp+ (1− α)q}
are closed in [0,1].
Now consider someone who would like to be fair, but between two unfair lotteries she prefers the one that is more
fair. Formally, for all pi, pi′ ∈ [0; 1] : pi · (1 − pi) ≥ pi′ · (1 − pi′) if and only if (x;pi, y; 1 − pi) % (x;pi′, y; 1 − pi′). The
axiom of Strict FOSD is trivially satisfied since there is no lottery that strictly first-order stochastically dominates
another lottery. Axiom of continuity is satisfied. However, axiom of FOSD is violated: (x; 2
3
, y; 1
3
) weakly first order-
stochastically dominates (x; 1
2
, y; 1
2
), but (x; 1
2
, y; 1
2
)  (x; 2
3
, y; 1
3
).
Axiom (Continuity) % is continuous.
24The axiom of Strict FOSD does not imply the axiom of FOSD. An example can be derived from Machina (1989)
with preferences that satisfy Preference Relation and Strict FOSD but violate FOSD.
25Continuity alone is not sufficient for the axiom of Strict FOSD to imply the axiom of FOSD.
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Axiom (Rich domain) There are two outcomes x, y ∈ X such that x  y.
Proposition If a preference satisfies Preference Relation, Strict FOSD, Continuity, and Rich Domain then it
satisfies FOSD.
Proof: Suppose p weakly first-order stochastically dominates q. We need to show that p % q.
Suppose not, that is q  p.
Since X is finite there exits an x, x such that for all x: x % x, and an x % x. By the axiom of Rich Domain, x  x.
At least one of the following three cases is satisfied: (i) x  q, (ii) p  x or (iii) q % x  x % p.
(i) Since p weakly first-order stochastically dominates q, and x  q, for any α > 0 the lottery αx+(1−α)p strictly
first-order stochastically dominates q. But then {α : αx+ (1− α)p % q} = (0, 1], a violation of continuity.
(ii) Since p weakly first-order stochastically dominates q, and p  x, for any α > 0, p strictly first-order
stochastically dominates αx+ (1− α)q. But then {α : p % αx+ (1− α)q} = (0, 1], a violation of continuity.
(iii) First we show that all elements z in the support of q satisfy z ∼ x. First note that by definition of x, all
elements in the support satisfy x % z. Suppose there is at least one element z such that x  z, then x strictly first-
order stochastically dominates q, which by axiom Strict FOSD implies x  q, a contradiction. Thus, for all elements
z in the support of q we have z ∼ x.
Second, we show that all elements z in the support of p satisfy z ∼ x. First note that by definition of x, all
elements in the support satisfy z % x. Suppose there is at least one element z such that z  x, then p strictly
first-order stochastically dominates x, which by axiom SFOSD implies p  x, a contradiction. Thus for all elements
z in the support of p we have z ∼ x.
Since all elements in the support of q are indifferent to x, all elements in the support of p are indifferent to x, and
x is strictly preferred to x, q strictly first order stochastically dominates p. But that is a contradiction to p weakly
first order stochastically dominating q. Q.E.D.
Further note that if the cardinality of the outcome space is 2, then independence is as weak an axiom as first-order
stochastic dominance.
Axiom (Independence) % satisfies independence if for all lotteries p, q, r in P : p < q ⇔ αp+(1−α)r < αq+(1−α)r.
Proposition Consider X with 2 elements. If % on P(X) satisfies Preference Relation, Strict FOSD and FOSD,
then it satisfies Independence.
Proof: Without loss of generality let X = {x, y} and x < y. Denote k = αp+ (1− α)r and l = αq + (1− α)r.
(i) x ∼ y
Then l weakly first-order stochastically dominates k, and vice versa. Thus by FOSD l < k and k < l , thus k ∼ l .
(ii) x  y
(ii.i) p and q are identical: Then k = l and trivially k ∼ l.
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(ii.ii) p ∼ q but not identical: Then one must strictly first-order stochastically dominate the other, which by Strict
FOSD contradicts indifference.
(ii.iii) p  q : By the lemma below, this implies p(x) > q(x), and thus p(y) < q(y), then k strictly first-order
stochastically dominates l:
For y:
∑
y%z
k(z)= k(y) = αp(y) + (1− α)r(y) < αq(y) + (1− α)r(y) = l(y) = ∑
y%z
l(z).
For x:
∑
x%z
k(z)= 1 =
∑
x%z
l(z).
Thus by Strict FOSD l  k. Q.E.D.
Lemma Consider X = {x, y} and x  y. If % on P(X) satisfies Preference Relation and Strict FOSD, then p  q
if and only if p(x) > q(x).
Proof: 1.) p  q implies p(x) > q(x).
Proof by Contradiction: Suppose p(x) ≤ q(x).
i) p(x) = q(x): This implies that p = q, and thus trivially by completeness p ∼ q, a contradiction.
ii) p(x) < q(x): Since x  y this means that q strictly first order stochastically dominates p, and thus by Strict
FOSD q  p, a contradiction.
2.) p(x) > q(x) implies p  q: This follows from Strict FOSD. Q.E.D.
Note that there are examples where Independence is violated but FOSD is not. Cumulative prospect theory is
one such example where the Allais paradox is allowed (thus violating Independence) but FOSD is satisfied.
Next, we illustrate consequentialist-deontological preferences where the optimal decision changes as the probability
of being consequentialist changes. Let u(x1, d) = f(x1)+b(d). Then, U(x1, d) = pi(f(xC1 )+b(d))+(1−pi)(f(xN1 )+b(d))
and V (d) = pif(ω − d) + (1− pi)f(ω − κ) + b(d). The first order condition is: ∂V (d)
∂d
= −pif1(ω − d) + b1(d) = 0. For
d∗ to be a maximum, the second order condition yields: ∂
2V (d)
∂d2
= pif11(ω − d) + b11(d) < 0. Applying the implicit
function theorem to the first order condition yields: ∂d
∗
∂pi
= f1(ω−d
∗)
pif11(ω−d∗)+b11(d∗) < 0, since utility is increasing in its
own outcomes and the denominator which is the second derivative of the indirect objective function is negative.
Note that the recipient’s payoff is a function of the DM’s payoffs, but as long as other-regarding concerns are
concave then the sum of utility from DM’s own payoffs and utility from others’ payoffs is still concave and the
above result holds. Decisions do not have to be continuous to obtain this result. If decisions are discrete, then the
behavior of a mixed consequentialist-deontological person is jumpy (i.e., it weakly increases as her decision becomes
less consequential).
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APPENDIX B: LAB INSTRUCTIONS
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Appendix Figure 1.— Lab Implementation
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Appendix Figure 2.— Sample Screenshot of Lab Experiment
Notes: Shredding Experiment Instructions Donation Screen for Subject with pi = 3/16 and κ = 0.
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Appendix Figure 3.— Donation Decision Placed in Sealed Envelope
 
 
Donation decision of subject number: 2 
If you see the congratulations screen:  
Of the CHF20 I want to donate 
 
  
CHF to Doctors Without Borders. 
 
 
If you have made too many mistakes:  
Please check this box:  
  
 
After marking exactly one box, please put this sheet in the envelope and seal it.  
→ Then click OK on the screen so the experiment can proceed! 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
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APPENDIX C: MTURK INSTRUCTIONS
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